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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
I. WORKERS' COMPENSATION AND THE SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE
TEST UNDER THE SOUTH CAROLINA ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES
ACT
A. Judicial Review of Industrial Commission Award Limited
to Substantial Evidence Test
The South Carolina Administrative Procedures Act (APA)1
provides for judicial review of administrative agency decisions. A
court may reverse an agency's decision "if substantial rights of
the appellant have been prejudiced because the administrative
findings . . . are . . . clearly erroneous in view of the reliable,
probative and substantial evidence on the whole record."2 The
South Carolina Supreme Court has interpreted this language to
espouse the "substantial evidence rule" as the appropriate stan-
dard of review.3 Substantial evidence is "'not a mere scintilla of
evidence nor evidence viewed blindly from one side of the case,
but is evidence which, considering the record as a whole, would
allow reasonable minds to reach the conclusion that the admin-
istrative agency reached or must have reached in order to justify
its action.' ,4
1. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 1-23-10 to -400 (1986).
2. Id. § 1-23-380(g)(5).
3. Lark v. Bi-Lo, Inc., 276 S.C. 130, 276 S.E.2d 304 (1981).
4. Id. at 135, 276 S.E.2d at 306 (quoting Law v. Richland County School Dist. No. 1,
270 S.C. 492, 495-96, 243 S.E.2d 192, 193 (1978)).
1
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In Webber v. Michelin Tire Corp.5 the South Carolina
Court of Appeals reversed a circuit court determination that the
Industrial Commission's decision was not supported by "sub-
stantial evidence." The appellant, Mary Anne Webber, filed a
workers' compensation claim for a back injury. The single com-
missioner found that Mrs. Webber suffered a permanent disabil-
ity consisting of a forty-five percent loss of use of her lower back
and awarded her compensation for 135 weeks. The full Commis-
sion amended this award to provide compensation for up to 500
weeks for total permanent disability. The respondent, Michelin
Tire Corporation, filed a petition for judicial review.
6
The circuit court, relying largely upon the lack of credibility
of the witness, found that the full Commission's finding was not
supported by substantial evidence. The medical evidence before
the commission consisted of the opinions of the treating physi-
cian, an examining physician, and a vocational rehabilitation ex-
pert. The trial judge noted that each opinion was based upon
the claimant's contention of bodily pain and limitation. In con-
trast, the respondent offered a six-minute movie, showing Mrs.
Webber attending a sports event and vacuuming her car.7
The court of appeals reversed, holding that the court vio-
lated the APA by substituting its judgment as to the weight of
the evidence. The court reasoned that the standard of review ex-
ercised by the circuit court violated the supreme court's pro-
nouncement that the "substantial evidence test 'need not and
must not be either judicial fact finding or a substitution of judi-
cial judgment for agency judgment.' "8 Furthermore, the court
noted that a judgment upon which reasonable men might differ
will not be set aside. The court also found that the possibility of
drawing two inconsistent conclusions from the evidence does not
prevent a finding that the administrative agency ruling is sup-
ported by substantial evidence."
The South Carolina legislature patterned its APA after the
Model State Administrative Act 10 and intended to give the
5. 285 S.C. 581, 330 S.E.2d 547 (Ct. App. 1985).
6. Id. at 582, 330 S.E.2d at 547.
7. Id. at 583-84, 330 S.E.2d at 548.
8. Larh, 276 S.C. at 136, 276 S.E.2d at 307 (quoting Dickinson-Tidewater, Inc. v.
Supervisor of Assessments, 273 Md. 245, 256, 329 A.2d 18, 25 (1974)).
9. 285 S.C. at 584, 330 S.E.2d at 548.
10. See Administrative Law, Annual Survey of South Carolina Law, 30 S.CL. REv.
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courts greater appellate authority over an agency's finding.1'
Under the Model Act, some courts "will reverse if the findings
are against the clear weight of the evidence .. .even though
there is evidence [supporting the findings] that by itself would
be substantial."',2 Although the South Carolina Supreme Court
has acknowledged the legislative intent to broaden the standard
of review,13 the courts, as a practical matter, seem to apply a
standard which more closely resembles the "mere scintilla" test
used prior to the enactment of the APA.
Webber exemplifies the broad discretion given to an admin-
istrative agency. Although the South Carolina courts continue to
adhere to the narrow interpretation given to the standard of re-
view under the APA, this interpretation of the substantial evi-
dence rule may be unduly restrictive.
James M. Griffin
B. Claimant's Testimony May Be Sufficient to Pass
Substantial Evidence Test when Injury Is Not "Technically
Complicated"
In Linen v. Ruscon Construction Co.1 4 the South Carolina
Supreme Court held that the Industrial Commission properly re-
lied upon the claimant's testimony in a workers' compensation
action in which the claimant disagreed with doctors about the
extent of his disability. The court found that the claimant's tes-
timony, taken in conjunction with the other evidence on the rec-
ord, provided substantial evidence to support a fifty percent dis-
ability award.' 5
Linen initiated the action for compensation for a back in-
jury sustained while in the course and scope of his employment
with Ruscon. The commissioner awarded a twenty percent per-
1 (1979).
11. 276 S.C. at 136, 276 S.E.2d at 305.
12. See, e.g., Application of Kauai Elec. Div. of Citizens Util. Co., 60 Haw. 166, 186,
590 P.2d 524, 538 (1978); accord Hayes v. Yount, 87 Wash. 2d 280, 286, 552 P.2d 1038,
1042 (1976).
13. Ellis v. Spartan Mills, 276 S.C. 216, 277 S.E.2d 590 (1981).
14. 286 S.C. 67, 332 S.E.2d 211 (1985).
15. A finding of 50% disability is particularly relevant because it constitutes total
disability. S.C. CODE ANN. § 42-9-30(19) (1976).
1986]
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manent disability to Linen. On appeal, however, the full Indus-
trial Commission raised the award to a fifty percent disability.
This higher award was subsequently affirmed by the circuit
court and the supreme court.
The evidence reviewed by the Industrial Commission in-
cluded the testimony of the claimant, a neurologist, an
orthopaedic surgeon, and a vocational rehabilitation counselor.
The neurologist had found a fifteen percent permanent impair-
ment to the claimant's back. This injury was subject to aggrava-
tion by repetitive bending and lifting. The orthopaedic surgeon
estimated that the impairment was twenty to thirty percent. Ac-
cording to the surgeon, the impairment was subject to aggrava-
tion by heavy manual labor. Linen maintained that he had suf-
fered a seventy-five percent loss of the use of his back, including
an inability to stand or sit in one position for a prolonged period
of time, difficulty in sleeping, and general back pain which in-
creased upon bending or lifting. The vocational expert testified
that Linen was not employable. Despite the disagreement on the
extent of the disability, the claimant and the doctors agreed that
he was unable to return to his former job.16
On appeal Ruscon argued that the full Commission's finding
of fifty percent disability was not supported by substantial evi-
dence because the medical testimony supported an award of no
more than thirty percent. Therefore, Ruscon argued, the fifty
percent award was improperly based upon the claimant's testi-
mony. The supreme court rejected this argument, ruling that lay
testimony is admissible if the injury in question is not so techni-
cally complicated that it requires exclusively expert testimony."
Thus, the court found that there existed substantial evidence to
support the fifty percent disability award."8
16. 286 S.C. at 68-69, 332 S.E.2d at 212.
17. See Bundrick v. Powell's Garage, 248 S.C. 496, 151 S.E.2d 437 (1966).
18. In finding that the evidence in this case was capable of supporting the award,
the court distinguished Wynn v. Peoples Natural Gas Co., 238 S.C. 1, 118 S.E.2d 812
(1961) and McLeod v. Piggly Wiggly Carolina Co., 280 S.C. 466, 313 S.E.2d 38 (Ct. App.
1984). In Wynn the court refused to find substantial evidence supporting an award of
total disability (resulting from a heart attack) when the claimant's doctors testified that
the claimant was able to return to work. 238 S.C. at 12-13, 118 S.E.2d at 818. In the
instant case, both the doctors and the claimant agreed that the claimant could not return
to his former job. In McLeod the court of appeals found that the injury to the back and
the presence of a congenital defect required more evidence than merely the testimony of
a general practitioner and the claimant. 280 S.C. at 471, 313 S.E.2d at 40-41. In the
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In considering a disability award in a workers' compensation
action, the dual component nature of the award must be recog-
nized. The award is a combination of medical and earning im-
pairment.19 Medical impairment includes limitations on range of
motion and loss of strength or coordination. Earning impairment
includes the ability of the claimant to find similar or substitute
employment. In Linen the doctors' testimony related to the
claimant's medical impairment.20 Linen's testimony and the tes-
timony of the vocational expert were more closely tied to the
earning impairment component of the disability. Although the
medical impairment ratings assigned by the doctors were sub-
stantially less than fifty percent, the evidence regarding inability
of the claimant to return to his former job and his future em-
ployment appeared to indicate a substantial earning impair-
ment. The evidence presented, including the testimony of the
claimant, provided an ample basis for the Industrial Commis-
sion's award.21
The decision in Linen indicates a willingness of the South
Carolina Supreme Court to allow claimants to testify about the
extent and effects of their injuries. Although such testimony
may conflict with expert opinions, especially opinions regarding
medical impairment, the claimant's evaluation of his condition
could prove to be helpful in determining the overall extent of
disability.22
Charles M. Black, Jr.
II, HEARING COMMISSIONER IN WORKERS' COMPENSATION
ACTION HAS DISCRETION TO REOPEN PROCEEDINGS TO TAKE
ADDITIONAL EVIDENCE
In Brown v. La France Industries23 the South Carolina
Court of Appeals found that a hearing commissioner did not
instant case, however, the doctors were experts.
19. See 21 LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW § 57.11 (1986).
20. 286 S.C. at 68-69, 332 S.E.2d at 211-12.
21. Id. at 70, 332 S.E.2d at 212.
22. For a discussion of reasons for allowing lay testimony, even in contradiction of
expert medical testimony, see 3 LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW § 79.53 (1986).
23. 286 S.C. 319, 333 S.E.2d 348 (Ct. App. 1985).
19861
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abuse his discretion in reopening a workers' compensation case
in order to take additional medical testimony after the sched-
ule.A hearing had concluded.24 Before Brown, neither the court of
appeals nor the Supreme Court of South Carolina had ruled on a
hearing commissioner's discretionary right to take further evi-
dence by reopening proceedings. The court's ruling is in accord
with most jurisdictions that have addressed this issue.25
On October 29, 1979, Brown, a weaver for La France, col-
lapsed and died of a heart attack at his work station.2 The
claimants, decedent's wife and child, filed for maximum benefits
under the South Carolina Workers' Compensation Law,2 7 con-
tending that Brown died as a result of an accidental injury to his
heart arising out of and in the course of his employment.
The single commissioner heard the case in two separate
hearings. At the conclusion of the second hearing, the commis-
sioner left the case open for the sole purpose of allowing the
claimants to take and submit the deposition of Dr. Walker. Ap-
proximately two months after submitting Dr. Walker's deposi-
tion and before the commissioner rendered his decision, the
claimants moved before the single commissioner for an order au-
thorizing them to take the deposition of Dr. Hodge. They as-
serted that their attorney had inadvertently failed to request
that the matter be left open for this purpose. The commissioner
granted the claimants' motion and concomitantly authorized La
France to take expert medical testimony in response to Dr.
Hodge's deposition. Neither the full commission nor the circuit
court found an abuse of discretion in allowing the proceedings to
be reopened. The court of appeals affirmed.
24. Other issues on appeal related to the admission of certain medical expert testi-
mony and to the sufficiency of the evidence to support the finding that Brown died as a
result of an injury by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment.
25. "It may be said as a general rule that the right to reopen proceedings to take
further evidence in workmen's compensation hearings is within the sound discretion of
the hearing officer." Crump v. Fields, 251 Miss. 864, 871, 171 So. 2d 857, 859 (1965)(cit-
ing 100 C.J.S. Workmen's Compensation § 596 (1958)); see Sanchez v. Industrial
Comm'n, 13 Ariz. App. 82, 474 P.2d 441 (1970); Cameron v. American Can Co., 120 Ga.
App. 236, 170 S.E.2d 267 (1969).
26. Brown had a history of rheumatic fever as a child and suffered from vascular
heart disease. 286 S.C. at 332, 333 S.E.2d at 350. There is also evidence that, on the day
of his death, Brown cut firewood before reporting to work and told a fellow worker that
he was exhausted. Despite this evidence, the commissioner ruled that Brown died as a
result of unusual work conditions. Id. at 328, 333 S.E.2d at 353.
27. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 42-1-10 to 42-19-40 (1976).
[Vol. 38
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According to the Brown court, it is a well-established rule in
South Carolina "that the decision of the trial judge to allow a
party to reopen his case will not be reversed unless the opposing
party was prejudiced thereby. '2 The court of appeals reasoned
that since La France was expressly authorized to present rebut-
tal testimony and failed to do so, the defendant suffered no
prejudice by the reopening of the case.29
The Brown court adopted the rule that "when the claimant
inadvertently omits production of . . . [necessary medical evi-
dence], an opportunity should be afforded the claimant to sup-
ply such omission in the interests of justice."30 The authority
relied upon by the court, however, does not support the adop-
tion of the rule under the present facts. 1 The claimants in
Brown made no mention of their intention to depose Dr. Hodge
until approximately two months after the case had been closed.
It appears that the first time claimants' counsel considered de-
posing Dr. Hodge was after Dr. Walker testified in deposition
that he could not say what had caused Brown's death.32
In upholding a claim of inadvertence in Brown, the court of
appeals has endowed hearing commissioners with a questionable
degree of discretion in taking additional evidence after a hearing
28. 286 S.C. at 324, 333 S.E.2d at 351. The court stated that "[a] trial judge enjoys
considerable latitude and discretion in these matters." Id. at 325, 333 S.E.2d at 351. The
court also stated that "similar discretion reposes with the single commissioner." Id. (cit-
ing Exxon Co. v. Alexis, 370 So. 2d 1128 (Fla. 1978)).
29. 286 S.C. at 325, 333 S.E.2d at 351.
30. Id. at 324, 333 S.E.2d at 351 (citing Independent School Dist. No. 1 of Tulsa v.
Albus, 572 P.2d 554 (Okla. 1977)). This ruling is in clear derogation of S.C. Indus.
Comm'n R., S.C. CODE ANN. (R. & REG.) 67-31 (1976), which states:
Adjournment may be allowed only for presenting additional evidence when
such evidence is in existence, identified, and necessary for decision and when
notice and motion for adjournment has been filed with the hearing Commis-
sioner and the opposing party three days before the scheduled hearing.
Id. The court of appeals, however, has recently decided that "[u]nder ... Rule [67-31],
the single commissioner is given discretionary power with respect to the taking of addi-
tional testimony." Holcombe v. Dan River MillsAVoodside Div., 286 S.C. 223, 225-26, 333
S.E.2d 338, 340 (Ct. App. 1985).
31. Compare Brown with Exxon Co. v. Alexis, 370 So. 2d 1128 (Fla. 1978)(claimant,
through inadvertence, failed to present any evidence or testimony bearing on a primary
issue in the case) and with Croteau v. Harvey & Landers, 99 N.H. 264, 109 A.2d 553
(1954)(claimant sought to introduce newly discovered medical testimony) and with Bow-
ling v. Blackwell Zinc Co., 359 P.2d 731 (Okla. 1960)(evidence offered to show change for
the worse in condition of claimant). The facts of Brown reveal no similarly compelling
reason for reopening the case to take further evidence.
32. Brief of Appellant at 4.
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has been closed. 3 After Brown, a party whose evidence fails to
carry his burden of proof may continue to search for supportive
evidence after the matter is purportedly closed and then claim
inadvertence in an effort to introduce such evidence. These ef-
forts are likely to be successful where the sympathies of the
hearing commissioner are with the moving party. In the interests
of finality, administrative efficiency, and fairness, the rule of law
set forth in Brown should apply only to claims of inadvertence
supported, not contradicted, by the facts.
J. Mark Jones
III. FEE DISPUTES BOARD NOT AN "AGENCY" AS DEFINED BY
THE APA
In Kores Nordic (USA) Corp. v. Sinkler, Gibbs & Simons
34
the South Carolina Court of Appeals held that a decision of the
Resolution of Fee Disputes Board, a division of the South Caro-
lina Bar, was not reviewable pursuant to the South Carolina Ad-
ministrative Procedures Act (APA) .35The court based this rul-
ing on the determination that the Fee Disputes Board is not an
"agency" as defined by the APA, and, therefore, is not subject to
APA provisions. 6
The dispute in this case arose after Kores Nordic engaged
Sinkler, Gibbs & Simons to collect a disputed debt of $205,000.
A settlement was reached in which Kores Nordic received
$10,000 less than its claim. In the absence of a formal written
agreement, Sinkler, Gibbs & Simons claimed that it was entitled
to a contingency fee based on the amount of the debt collected.
Kores Nordic, however, asserted that the fee should be calcu-
lated according to the time devoted by Sinkler to representing
Kores Nordic. Instead of litigating the matter, Kores Nordic vol-
33, The very purpose of S.C. Indus. Comm'n R., S.C. CODE ANN. (R. & REG.) 67-31
(1976) is to promote finality and administrative efficiency by establishing parameters
whereby evidence may be admitted after a hearing is closed. Brief of Appellant at 4.
Broadly interpreting a hearing commissioner's discretionary power with respect to taking
additional evidence may render Regulation 67-31 ineffectual and create an intolerable
degree of uncertainty in evidentiary matters.
34. 284 S.C. 513, 327 S.E.2d 365 (Ct. App. 1985).
35. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 1-23-310 to -400 (1986).
36. 284 S.C. at 516, 327 S.E.2d at 365.
[Vol. 38
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untarily submitted the dispute to the Fee Disputes Board and
agreed to be bound by the Board's disposition of the matter.
Kores Nordic, however, was dissatisfied with the Board's deci-
sion and attempted to appeal to the circuit court pursuant to
the APA.3 7 Sinkler's motion to dismiss the appeal was granted
by the circuit court before Kores Nordic filed its case and excep-
tions.38 The court of appeals affirmed the circuit court's order
dismissing the appeal 39
The court of appeals reasoned that the APA's requirement
that a final decision be rendered by an "agency" before judicial
review may be sought,40 coupled with the statutory exclusion of
the legislature and the courts from the definition of "agency,
'41
shielded Fee Disputes Board decisions from the appeal provi-
sions of the APA. According to the court of appeals, the Fee Dis-
putes Board falls within the exclusion of the courts because the
Board "is a creature of the South Carolina Bar, '42 which is au-
thorized to "act as an administrative agency of the Supreme
Court of South Carolina. 43 Thus, the Fee Disputes Board is an
agency of "the courts" and within the statutory exclusion em-
bodied in the APA.
The South Carolina courts have interpreted "agency," for
the purposes of the APA, to include such entities as the Alco-
holic Beverage Control Commission,44 the Industrial Commis-
sion,45 the Coastal Council,48 and the Employment Security
Commission. 47 These agencies, however, are organized under the
executive branch of government. The Fee Disputes Board, as an
arm of an agency of the supreme court, clearly falls within the
37. Id. at 514, 327 S.E.2d at 366.
38. Id. at 514-15, 327 S.E.2d at 366.
39. Id. at 516, 327 S.E.2d at 366.
40. See D. SHIPLEY, SOUTH CAROLINA ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 5-4 (1983).
41. S.C. CODE ANN. § 1-23-310(1) (1986) defines "agency" as "each state board, com-
mission, department or officer, other than the legislature or the courts, authorized by
law to make rules or to determine contested cases." (emphasis added).
42. 284 S.C. at 515, 327 S.E.2d at 366.
43. S.C. CODE ANN. § 40-5-20(e) (1986).
44. Schudel v. S.C. Alcoholic Beverage Control Comm'n, 276 S.C. 138, 276 S.E.2d
308 (1981).
45. Lark v. Bi-Lo, Inc., 276 S.C. 130, 276 S.E.2d 304 (1981).
46. Guerard v. Whitner, 276 S.C. 521, 280 S.E.2d 539 (1981).
47. Todd's Ice Cream, Inc. v. S.C. Employment Sec. Comm'n, 281 S.C. 254, 315
S.E.2d 373 (Ct. App. 1984).
1986]
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statutory exclusion.48 Furthermore, parties voluntarily seek re-
lief before the Fee Disputes Board and agree to be bound by the
decision of the Board. The purpose of the Fee Disputes Board is
to provide an alternative to litigation of disputes. Kores Nordic
reaffirms this principle since appeal of Board decisions to the
courts pursuant to APA provisions would defeat this purpose.
Charles M. Black, Jr.
48. The reasoning of the Kores Nordic court would probably be extended to other
entities operating under the South Carolina Supreme Court. This would preclude the
application of the APA to such entities as the Board of Law Examiners, the Board of
Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline, and the Commission on Continuing Law-
yer Competence. 284 S.C. at 515 n.2, 327 S.E.2d at 366 n.2.
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